This paper analyzes the impact of economic performance on voter turnout. We estimate an economic turnout model in which local economic variables are included in quadratic form, so that non-linear effects can be taken into account. We use panel datasets covering municipalities, from 1979 to 2005, and cross-sections of parishes (freguesias) to analyze the determinants of turnout at Portuguese municipal and legislative elections. The empirical results indicate that the performance of the national economy is important only in legislative elections and that the regional and local unemployment rates tend to have nonlinear relationships to turnout. The results obtained for Flemish municipalities also provide evidence in favor of a non-linear effect of unemployment on turnout.
Introduction
Since the 1980s, numerous studies have analyzed the determinants of voter turnout and various theories have emerged addressing the many different aspects of the theme (see Geys 2006a Geys , 2006b and Blais 2006 for encompassing surveys). As it stands, the existing research has established some robust patterns. Sociological characteristics, especially age and education, have been consistently referenced as important explanatory factors (Blais 2000; Franklin 2004; Lijphart 1997) . We also know relatively well why turnout is higher in some countries than in others. Comparative studies show that different Institutional arrangements embodied in electoral laws provide different turnout outcomes (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Jackman; Miller 1995) . In general, the more accountable and competitive the political systems are, the larger is electoral mobilization.
However, regarding the effect of the economy on turnout, the literature provides mixed results and is far from reaching a consensus. Strong evidence is found supporting the idea that the economy affects how a person votes and a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the issue (Paldam 2004; Nannestad and Paldam 1994) . Comparatively, studies analyzing if (and how) the economy affects whether a person votes or not are scarce and we find conflicting theories and inconsistent results. There is, however, relatively strong support for the hypothesis that turnout is higher in economically advanced countries (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Norris 2002; Fornos et al. 2004 ).
The main goal of this paper is to provide new insights and contribute to a better understanding of this relationship. Using five extensive datasets, we find robust empirical evidence indicating that economic conditions affect turnout rates in Portugal, not only at legislative elections (elections to the national assembly), but also at municipal elections. 3 Moreover, the results support the hypothesis that the economy has non-linear effects on turnout. That is, the presence and magnitude of mobilization or withdrawal effects on turnout depend on economic performance. Concretely, there is greater turnout in good and bad times (mobilization effect), but participation rates are lower if the economy is neither too hot nor too cold: voters withdraw in a 'Goldilocks state'. These results are corroborated in a robustness test in which we use data from Geys and Heyndels (2006) 
on the 2000
Flemish municipal elections. Although these authors did not find evidence of a linear effect of the unemployment rate on turnout, there is evidence of a non-linear (U-shaped) effect when squared unemployment is also included as an explanatory variable.
We believe that the identification of non-linear effects of economic variables on turnout is a significant contribution to the literature. It is possible that many previous studies obtained mixed results for the effects of economic performance on turnout because the possibility that those effects are non-linear was not properly taken into account. 1 We simultaneously analyze legislative and municipal elections, using similar variables, models and estimation methods, thus permitting a clear assessment of the differences and similarities between turnout behavior at first-and second-order elections.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship between turnout and economic conditions. Section 3 describes the model and dataset used. The panel data results are presented in section 4, while section 5 reports the cross-sectional results. Finally, conclusions are presented in section 6. 4
Turnout and the economy
The literature provides two competing theories regarding the expected relationship between turnout and the economy. The first argues that people under economic strain are more prone to vote, in what Schlozman and Verba (1979) called a "mobilization" effect. In this view, people are encouraged to be more active politically (vote, protest, lobby…) because they blame the government for their economic hardships and wish to manifest their discontent regarding the government's policies. The "negative voting" theory (see Lau 1982 ) reinforces this argument as it posits that the political motivation to punish is greater than to reward; economic duress therefore should foster turnout.
The second theory argues the opposite. It assumes that voters respond to adverse economic conditions by withdrawing from the political process. The reason is that people suffering economic hardships face serious problems; they therefore tend to focus their efforts and attention on solving them and, as a result, pay less attention to external matters like politics. Rosenstone (1982) argues that this relationship holds, not only at the individual level, but also at the aggregate level, and some studies find evidence that especially the poor and the unemployed exhibit a markedly diminished capacity to participate in politics (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Caldeira et. al. 1985) .
Along with these two competing explanations, the alternative of no effect is also possible. This idea seems to dominate, as we find a sizeable literature either not addressing the issue of economics effects or reporting evidence supporting the notion that economic conditions do not affect turnout (e.g., Fiorina 1978; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2000 , Kostadinova 2003 Fornos et al. 2004 ).
However, a nil effect of the economy on turnout, as some studies report, is considerably different from a null effect. Radcliff (1992) points out that, as the two 5 competing theories exhibit solid arguments but contradictory claims regarding the expected effect of the economic environment on turnout, the most likely scenario is a nil overall effect, because both withdrawal and mobilization effects may indeed occur simultaneously and thus cancel each other out.
The null effect hypothesis raises the question of whether economic variables are being properly introduced in the turnout function. Radcliff (1992) provides a first insight on the matter when observing that in developed countries adverse economic conditions tend to depress turnout, as Rosenstone (1982) suggests, but in the developing countries the opposite occurs. He argues that "the difference may be attributable to the stakes involved.
In the absence of security programs the potential human costs of poor economic performance are much greater" (Radcliff 1992: 446) . He found evidence that the effect of the economy is best modeled when interacted with a measure of social welfare programs and using a polynomial form.
In this paper we try to go further by testing the hypothesis that both withdrawal and mobilization effects exist simultaneously and that different degrees of economic performance provide different stimuli to voters. We posit that in good and bad times the mobilization effect dominates, as voters may wish to express their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with economic performance, while situations in which the economy is neither too hot nor too cold may cause the withdrawal effect to be dominant.
These effects are consistent with the theory of expressive voting, according to which voting may be motivated by concerns other than the outcome of the election. Although an individual voter is aware that her vote has practically no chance of being decisive in a mass election, she may nevertheless desire to vote in order to express her satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the economic performance achieved by the incumbent government. As suggested by Hillman (2010) , material losses due to expressive behavior (such as those incurred when voting) may be very small or zero, which implies that expressive voting may have a positive net impact on a voter's total utility.
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The motivation to vote expressively may vary with economic conditions and be more salient in good and bad times. We expect voters to feel more compelled to express their satisfaction/dissatisfaction when the economy is good/bad, as they may want to reward/punish the incumbent at the ballot box. When the economy is neither too hot nor too cold, alienation from the political process is a strong possibility, as voters may not be concerned enough about the economy to actually participate. Furthermore, the economy may not be a sufficiently salient issue to be relevant for the decision of whether to vote or not.
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One way of modeling these effects is to use the economic variables in a quadratic form, as it allows the identification of increasing or decreasing marginal effects. We use this alternative in our analysis of turnout for the Portuguese elections. To conform to theoretical expectations the coefficients must result in an inverted U-shaped quadratic form for economic variables such as income or GDP (positive sign associated with the linear term and 7 a negative sign associated with the quadratic term) and exhibit the opposite shape for variables such as unemployment or inflation (negative sign associated with the linear term and a positive sign associated with the quadratic term).
Data and model specification
We To control for the municipalities' socio-demographic characteristics we include some of the typical explanatory variables found in empirical studies: population density, the illiteracy rate, the share of the resident population above 65 years old, and the percentage of the municipality's population employed in the tertiary sector. generally based on a stable trend, a constant growth rate was assumed to fill in the missing 10 This is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers almost all privately owned firms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included). 11 More concretely, the Sales Index (SI) is constructed according to the following equation:
where Pop m is the share of municipality m in the national population, and W mj is the weight of municipality m in the country total regarding variable j (the five variables considered are the fiscal burden, electricity consumption, number of cars sold, number of bank agencies, and number of retail commercial establishments). The values of the index are then normalized so that a value of 100 corresponds to the country average. 12 This refers to the classification of economic activities in three sectors: the primary, the secondary and the tertiary. The tertiary sector is characterized by the production of services instead of end products or raw materials. 10 data. Data on population by age are obtained by assuming a constant growth rate for the period 1979-1989, on the basis of the 1970 and 1981 censuses; for the remaining years annual data was acquired from INE's resident population estimates. A larger population is expected to be associated with lower electoral turnout. Population measures are often used to check Downs's (1957) claim of a direct relationship between turnout and the probability of casting the decisive vote. In general, studies show that higher education is linked with greater participation (see Blais 2000) . Therefore, one should expect the illiteracy rate to be negatively correlated with turnout. 13 Regarding age, studies generally report it having a positive effect on turnout. However, as we use the population over 65 years old, this effect may be mitigated because, for older people, health issues may inhibit some from going to the polls.
The percentage of the population employed in the tertiary (services) sector may be viewed as a proxy for urbanization and, simultaneously, a measure of education, as white collar workers tend to be more educated than the average worker. We have no prior expectation regarding the sign of the coefficient associated with this variable. On the one hand, sociological theory posits that urbanization tends to weaken interpersonal bonds (Hoffman-Martinot 1994), therefore depressing turnout but, on the other hand, higher levels of education seem to be related to more turnout.
The empirical model also includes a set of institutional variables traditionally found in turnout studies. We use a standard measure of closeness of the elections, defined as the difference in vote percentages between the largest party and its closest challenger (Winning margin). There is ample evidence regarding the importance and the positive effect of competiveness on turnout (Geys 2006a) . In our empirical model, for legislative elections this is a district measure, as deputies in Portugal are elected by district, while for local elections it is constructed by municipality, as all local government branches are elected for the municipality. With similar geographical differences between local and national elections, we introduce the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) index for the effective number of political parties. Theoretically, there is no consensus on whether fragmentation can be expected to increase or decrease political participation. Geys (2006a) reviews the aggregate-level literature on turnout and concludes that on this matter results are inconclusive.
Another political indicator used is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a local government is controlled by the party that holds power at the national level, and zero otherwise (Same party as national). This simultaneous government variable pinpoints the municipalities that exhibit the maximum clarity regarding the responsibility hypothesis, therefore enabling us to check if the reward/punishment mechanism associated with government voting also affects turnout. If so, the expected sign is negative, and reinforces the idea that turnout and government voting are linked. We also link the past government vote with current turnout by introducing in the empirical model for the legislative elections the votes received by the government in the previous election. We expect a negative effect on turnout, as some of the people that supported the government may be unhappy with its performance and find no credible alternative, therefore opting to abstain in the coming election. This means that the more overwhelming an electoral victory is the more it tends to depress future turnout.
Finally, one particular point of difference between local and national elections in
Portugal is the possibility of finding groups of citizens running alongside organized parties in municipal elections. We introduce a dummy variable to control for the presence of these 12 groups in local elections. Descriptive statistics for all variables used are found in the appendix.
Given the dynamic structure of the model, it is not appropriate to estimate equation
(1) using OLS. In both the fixed and random effects settings, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, even if we assume that the disturbances are not themselves autocorrelated. According to Arellano and Bond (1991) , this implies inconsistent estimates of the model, when, as in both our two samples, there is a clear dominance of cross sections (278 municipalities) over time periods (ten legislative or eight municipal elections). These authors developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that solves the problems referred to above. First differencing (1) removes the individual effects ( i ) and produces an equation that is estimable by instrumental variables. In this paper, we use the extended version of the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , the System-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models. Table 1 , only lagged turnout and the vectors of social and institutional variables described in the previous section were considered.
Panel data empirical results

--Insert Table 1 about here --
The results for legislative elections (see Column 1) indicate that turnout tends to be lower in municipalities with higher illiteracy rates, where the mayor belongs to the party that leads the national government, and where the national government obtained larger vote shares in previous elections. They also show that turnout is persistent, that is, turnout at previous elections is strongly and positively related to turnout in the current elections (the estimated coefficient is 0.8). All of these results conform to our expectations. Finally, turnout does not seem to be affected by demographic variables, the winning margin, and the number of effective parties. The insignificance of the coefficients estimated for the last two of those variables may be due to the fact that, for legislative elections, they are calculated at the district level.
Column 2 reports the results of the estimation for municipal elections. Results are similar to those obtained in Column 1 for all variables that were statistically significant, except simultaneous governing, which is no longer significant. Now, all demographic variables seem to affect turnout, which increases with larger percentages of the population over 65 years old, and is negatively related to the percentage of the population employed in the tertiary sector. The relationship with population density is also found to be negative thus supporting Downs's (1957) claim, as in smaller areas voters are more likely to affect the electoral result. However, because this effect is present only at municipal elections, another possibility is the closer proximity between voters and candidates for mayor found in smaller municipalities.
14 Finally, the results for the winning margin point to an increase in turnout when elections are more competitive (i.e., a smaller vote difference between the two top votewinning parties), a result in accordance with theoretical expectations and general empirical evidence. As to fragmentation, there are strong theoretical arguments supporting both positive and negative effects. Our results are supportive of the latter, as they show that a larger effective number of parties reduces turnout in Portugal. Jackman (1987) argues that, under given electoral rules, more fragmentation increases the need for coalition formation, thus decreasing the influence voters have on government formation. Additionally, more parties increase the complexity of the electoral choice (Blais and Dobrozynska 1998) and add extra information costs (Hoffman-Martinot 1994) that can discourage voters from going to the polls.
Economic variables are included in the estimations of Table 2 (legislative elections) and Table 3 (municipal elections). Each estimation of columns 1 to 3 includes the national unemployment rate and two municipal/regional economic variables in quadratic form.
Column 1 of Table 2 reports the results obtained for turnout at legislative elections when regional (NUTS III) unemployment and real GDP are included. 15 Higher national unemployment rates are associated with higher turnout, which provides evidence in favor of the mobilization approach (Schlozman and Verba 1979; Lau 1982; Rosenstone 1992 ). The regional (NUTS III) unemployment rate seems to have a U-shaped relationship with turnout (negative sign for the level and positive sign for the squared level). Thus, lower rates of regional unemployment have a negative effect on turnout but, as unemployment increases, the effect becomes positive. The turning point is at an estimated unemployment rate of 15 7.46%, in column 1, and of 7.59%, in column 3. Real GDP does not seem to affect turnout, when unemployment is taken into account.
--Insert Table 2 about here --
The average marginal effects of the unemployment rate on turnout are illustrated in Figure 1 . There is a statistically significant negative marginal effect for unemployment rates below 6%, and a significant positive marginal effect for rates above 10%. As indicated in the previous paragraph, the marginal effect is zero at a rate of 7.46%.
--Insert Figure 1 about here --
In the estimation of Column 2 of Table 2 , regional unemployment and GDP were replaced with the employment rate and real wages in the municipality. 16 As expected, there is evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between employment and turnout, with the turning point at an employment rate of 35%. The growth rate of real wages in the municipality does not seem to affect turnout. The regional (NUTS III) unemployment rate and the municipal sales index were used in the estimation of Column 3. 17 As expected, the former has a U-shaped relationship with turnout (as in Column 1), while the latter has an inverted U-shaped relationship. 18 Finally, the estimation of Column 4 includes the linear terms of all economic variables. Regional real GDP and municipal employment seem to be positively related to turnout. The absence of statistical significance for the regional unemployment rate may be due to the omission of the squared term, as the results of 16 Data are available from 1985 onwards. Relative to the estimation of column 1, we gain one election for 275 municipalities. 17 Since the municipal sales index is available only from 1992 onwards, this is the estimation with the smallest number of observations: we lose one election relative to column 1, and two elections relative to column 2. 18 The empirical evidence supporting the existence of non-linear effects of economic performance on turnout is practically the same when economic variables are mean-differenced in order to reduce the correlation between the linear and the quadratic terms. These results, not shown here, are available from the authors upon request. The turning point for the sales index is at 340, which is well above the sample maximum (160). Thus, for realistic values, turnout is increasing in the sales index and the effect essentially is linear. columns 1 and 3 clearly support the existence of a U-shaped relationship between the regional (NUTS III) unemployment rate and turnout.
Regarding the remaining explanatory variables, the most robust results are that turnout is persistent and that simultaneous governments reduce turnout. Greater competitiveness now seems to decrease turnout in columns 2 to 4, a result lacking theoretical explanation but one that some studies report (see Kirchgässner and Himmern 1997) . 19 The votes obtained by the national government in the previous election seem to increase turnout in the current election (see columns 1, 3 and 4). This result is a bit strange, as it is the opposite of the one obtained in Table 1 . Finally, the remaining independent variables are statistically significant only in one or two estimations, which may indicate that their relationship to turnout is not robust. Table 3 shows the results obtained for municipal elections. Contrary to what happened for legislative elections, the national unemployment rate does not seem to affect voter participation. Although some voters may wish to reward/penalize the national government in municipal elections, it is not likely that the mobilization effect is of a magnitude comparable to that at legislative elections, when voters are judging the national government directly.
--Insert Table 3 about here --
As happened for legislative elections, there is evidence of a U-shaped relationship between regional unemployment rates and turnout (see columns 1 and 3). Thus, in municipal elections, voters tend to pay more attention to regional (NUTS III) unemployment, which is more closely related to municipal economic performance than national unemployment rates. 20 The absence of statistical significance for the regional unemployment rate in column 4 may be due to the omission of the squared term. Regional real GDP, municipal employment, municipal real wages, and the municipal sales index do not seem to affect turnout, as none of these variables is statistically significant in the estimations of Table 3 . Concerning the other explanatory variables, there is robust evidence that turnout is persistent, that it increases with larger shares of the population over 65 years old, greater competitiveness, and in municipalities where lists of independent citizens run for office. Turnout falls with larger percentages of workers in the tertiary sector, a larger effective number of parties, and with simultaneous governments. Population density and the illiteracy rate are statistically significant only in column 2, both with a negative sign.
In an overall assessment, although unemployment seems to matter in both first-and second-order elections, our results for the economic variables are generally more robust for legislative elections. The opposite occurs with respect to institutional and sociodemographic variables; they seem to play a more important role in municipal elections. In light of the responsibility hypothesis, the first assessment makes sense, and, as to the second, it seems that different elections provide different stimuli to voters.
Cross-section empirical results
This section uses different datasets in order to test for the effects of parish (freguesia) and municipal level unemployment rates in turnout at the 2001 municipal elections and at the 2002 legislative elections. Yearly unemployment data are not available at the parish level, but because 2001 was a census year, it is possible to obtain this data and test the effect of this important economic variable at the lowest level of aggregation.
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We made two changes to the model estimated in the previous section. First, the percentage of the municipal population in the tertiary sector was replaced by a dummy variable, Urban Areas, which takes the value of one for the parishes that are essentially of urban nature, and zero for rural ones. Second, instead of the percentage of the municipal population over 65 years old, we use the percentage of retired people in each parish. They are very similar measures, and the substitution was made because these were the closest proxies we could find in the census data. In the regressions for legislative elections, we omitted the closeness measure and the number of parties because, as they are measured at the district level, their variability would be very small in a cross section of parishes (there would be only 18 different values for each of these variables).
We use three alternative estimation methods that deal with the typical problem of heteroscedasticity found in cross-section analysis. 21 The first is the standard OLS regression with robust standard errors. The second is the weighted least squares (WLS) method proposed by Madalla (1983) , which identifies the heteroscedastic process and proposes a logistic transformation of the dependent variable. 22 This method takes into account the population differences between parishes, thus yielding more efficient estimators than OLS.
In the third method, after the WLS, we use a Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) 23 in order to control for other unknown causes of heteroscedasticity. These last two methods are less vulnerable to heteroscedasticity than OLS.
The results of cross-section regressions for turnout at the parish (freguesia) level in
Portuguese legislative elections are reported in Table 4 . Since OLS results are less reliable 21 It is necessary to account for heteroscedasticity because both the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests rejected the homoscedasticity assumption in our model. Dubin and Kaslow (1996) for an application of this method. 23 Starting with the estimated logistic model, we correct for other potential sources of heteroscedasticity using the feasible generalized least square method proposed by Wooldridge (2003) .
than WLS and WLS/FGLS results, our comments concentrate on the latter two methods. The WLS results provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship between unemployment rates at the parish level and turnout. Considering that the turning point is at an unemployment rate of 17.9%, for most cases only the negative effect matters. This is what the WLS/FGLS results indicate, as squared unemployment is not statistically significant in column 3. Thus, higher unemployment at the parish level had essentially a demobilizing effect in the 2002 legislative elections.
--Insert Table 4 about here --
The WLS/FGLS results indicate that growth in wages at the parish level has an inverted U-shaped relationship with turnout, with a turning point at around 3%. Concerning the other independent variables, turnout is persistent, and it declines in urban areas, with higher illiteracy rates, and with the votes obtained by the national government in the previous election. The WLS/FGLS estimation results also indicate that turnout may increase with simultaneous governments and with larger percentages of retired people.
--Insert Table 5 about here --
The cross-section results for municipal elections are reported in Table 5 . The WLS and WLS/FGLS support the existence of a U-shaped relationship between unemployment and turnout, 24 which is in line with the panel data results reported in Table 3 . There is also evidence that higher wages increase turnout. In this case, the mobilization effect would be to reward the local government. Furthermore, turnout is persistent, it increases with simultaneous governments, with larger percentages of retired people, and when lists of 24 The turning points are at unemployment rates of 15.3% (WLS) and 14.3% (WLS/FGLS).
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independent citizens run alongside organized political parties. Finally, turnout seems to decrease in urban areas and to increase with competitiveness.
Finally, we conclude our empirical analysis with an extension of the turnout model of Geys and Heyndels (2006) for the Flemish Belgian municipalities. The aim is to check whether our results regarding the non-linear effects of economic variables are unique or not to the Portuguese case. Table 6 presents the results, and the variables' names used by the above-referenced authors are indicated in parentheses. The results reported in the first column are those of column 1 of Table 3 of Geys and Heyndels (2006) , 25 where unemployment (UNEM) is not statistically significant. In column two of Table 6 , we introduce this variable in quadratic form, by adding the squared unemployment rate to the list of explanatory variables. The results show that both coefficients related to unemployment are statistically significant, and their respective signs are in accordance with our theoretical expectations and our empirical results for Portugal. That is, unemployment also had a non-linear (U-shaped) relationship with turnout in the 2000 Flemish municipal elections, with the turning point at an unemployment rate of 4%. This suggests that our findings may be more than an idiosyncrasy of Portuguese voters or of a modeling whim.
Thus, the way in which economic variables, especially unemployment, have been modeled in previous empirical studies may help explain why several of them have concluded that the economic environment does not affect turnout.
--Insert Table 6 about here --
Conclusion
There is an extensive literature focusing on voter participation, and empirical studies have been able to identify a long list of variables that affect turnout. Nevertheless, the effect of economic performance on turnout is still an unsettled issue. There are two theoretical explanations for the effect of economic conditions on turnout which suggest opposing effects (mobilization versus withdrawal effects), and the empirical evidence has been mixed. Thus, there still is no consensus as to whether worse economic performance fosters or depresses turnout. In fact, several researchers argue that the economy does not affect voter participation at all. This paper's main contribution to the literature is to test the hypothesis that both withdrawal and mobilization effects exist simultaneously, and that different degrees of adverse economic conditions provide different stimuli to voters. Concretely, we hypothesize that turnout is higher both in good and bad times, a mobilization effect, as more people will want to express their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the economic performance achieved by the incumbent government. Participation rates are expected to be lower if the economy is neither too hot nor too cold, a withdrawal effect that may be due to economic issues being less salient for voters. These effects of the economy on turnout are consistent with the theory of expressive voting.
Using four extensive datasets, we perform system-GMM panel data estimations and OLS, WLS and WLS/FGLS cross-section estimations for turnout at Portuguese legislative and municipal elections. Our results provide robust empirical evidence indicating that economic conditions affect voter participation rates. Moreover, the results support the hypothesis that the economy has non-linear effects on turnout. That is, the presence and magnitude of the mobilization or withdrawal effects depend on the severity of economic conditions. We 22 find a U-shaped relationship between unemployment rates and turnout: at low rates, unemployment seems to have withdrawal effects, while for higher rates (above 7.5%) it has mobilization effects. Employment rates and real wages are also found to have non-linear effects on turnout, with the expected signs (consistent with an inverted U-shaped relationship). Similar results are obtained when extending the turnout model of Geys and Heyndels (2006) to the 2000 Flemish municipal elections. Specifically, when the squared unemployment rate is added to their model, both the linear term (which was not significant in their study) and the squared term are statistically significant, with the expected signs.
That is, we find evidence of a non-linear (U-shaped) effect of the unemployment rate on turnout, indicating that these non-linear effects are not a peculiarity of the Portuguese case,
and may be present in other countries. Thus, the mixed results for the effects of economic performance on turnout obtained in previous studies may be due to the fact that nonlinearities were not tested for or were not properly taken into account. 
